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II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal from a conviction for possession of a controlled substance following a 
conditional guilty plea. R 113-118, 120-124. Relief should be granted because Appellant 
Desirae Tracy's motion to suppress evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment and 
Idaho Const. Art. I, § 17 should have been granted. Augmented Record, Motion to Suppress 
filed 7 /16/12. In particular the district court erred in finding that exigent circumstances permitted 
a warrantless entry into Ms. Tracy's home. While the district court found that police concerns of 
injuries to people inside the home justified a warrantless entry, at the time the police made the 
entry, all the people in the home had already been inspected by the police and were in fact 
without injuries. R 94-99. Further, if the police had any remaining concerns regarding the 
ongoing safety of Ms. Tracy and her children, they were bound by the state and federal 
constitutions to give Ms. Tracy the option of remaining outside the home while a warrant was 
secured if probable cause could be established. Thus, an intrusion into the home on the basis of 
exigent circumstances was not justified. State v. Reynolds, 146 Idaho 466, 197 P.3d 327 (Ct. 
App. 2008). 
B. Procedural History and Statement of Facts 
On February 25, 2012, "a neighbor" called 911 to report a verbal disturbance, crying, loud 
noises, and what he/she thought might be the sound of a female being thrown inside an 
apartment. Tr. 10/31/12, p. 13, In. 1-6. The person making the report mentioned prior 
disturbances and concerns about children being present. The person also reported that the male 
had left the apartment. Tr. 10/31 /12. p. 13. In. 10-18. 
Officer Cox and Officer Rush went to the apartment and "made contact at the door" with 
Ms. Tracy. Tr. 10/31/12, p. 14, In. 1-11; p. 35, In. 14-18. Ms. Tracy answered Officer Cox's 
questions, reporting that she and her two children were in the apartment. Officer Cox could see 
one of the children from the doorway and saw that neither Ms. Tracy nor the child appeared to be 
injured. Tr. 10/13/12, p. 15, In. 8-22; p. 35, In. 6-8. In addition, Officer Cox could not hear any 
crying, screaming, sounds of movement or anything like that coming from the apartment. Tr. 
10/31/12, p. 34, In. 14-21. Officer Cox and Officer Rush did not observe any broken glass or 
blood or apparently any signs of a struggle outside the apartment. Tr. 4/18 and 20/12, p. 36, In. 
19-p. 20, In. 5; p. 74, In. 2-18. 1 
In response to Officer Cox's question, Ms. Tracy said that her other child was upstairs 
sleeping. Tr. 10/31/12, p. 15, In. 4-14. 
Officer Cox asked for permission to come inside to make sure that everyone was okay. 
Ms. Tracy declined. However, she did volunteer to bring the other child, a baby boy, downstairs 
for an inspection outside the apartment by the police. Tr. 10/31112, p. 15, In. 16-18. 
Ms. Tracy's offer to bring the baby to the police cause Officer Cox to believe that it was 
"highly likely that the male subject" was "most likely" upstairs. Tr. 10/31/12, p. 15, In. 25 - p. 
16, In. 3. Officer Cox kept her hand on the door while Ms. Tracy went upstairs to get the baby. 
At the preliminary hearing, Officer Cox testified that had Ms. Tracy tried to close the door, she 
would have forced her way inside. Tr. 4/18 and 20/12, p. 23, In. 18 - p. 24, In. 2. 
Officer Cox based her belief that it was highly likely that Mr. Tracy was upstairs on her 
1 The transcript of the preliminary hearing was considered by the district court in 
deciding the motion to suppress pursuant to the state's request, Tr. 10/31/12, p. 39, In. 2-22, and 
is a part of the record in this Court. R 133. 
2 
prior experiences. Tr. I 0/31/12, p. 15, In. 25 - p. 17, In. 1. She testified that victims of domestic 
violence commonly cover for one another and hide the wrongdoer and further that it is very 
common for a person involved in domestic violence to leave and then return. She also testified 
that she sees children "become embroiled in the incident." Tr. 10/31/12, p. 10, In. 14 - p. 12, In. 
6. 
Based upon this experience, Officer Cox testified: 
Well, in most cases, you know, we have to be concerned about the fact that the 
other individual could be in the residence or had come back before we had gotten 
there. So, you know, it was highly likely that the other individual could have been 
inside the residence, as well as somebody else that I wasn't aware of. 
Tr.10/31/12,p.16,ln.20-p.17,ln.1. 
Officer Cox testified that Ms. Tracy came downstairs with the baby boy. Tr. 10/31/12, p. 
17, In. 13-15. He was eight or nine months old, calm, not crying, and wearing a diaper. Tr. 
10/31 /! 2, p. 1 7, In. 18-20; Tr. 4/18 and 20/12, p. 30, In. 2-5. However, Officer Cox was 
concerned because "he looked red, like his entire body." Tr. 10/31 /12, p. 17, In. 21-22. She 
described red marks like lines on his body and "kind of an indentation." Tr. 10/31/12, p. 17, In. 
23-25. She could not tell what was wrong, but he was red. Tr. 10/31/12, p. 17, In. 25 - p. 18, In. 
2. 
Officer Cox asked Ms. Tracy what was wrong with the baby and Ms. Tracy said that he 
had been asleep and that the marks would disappear. Tr. 10/31 /12 p. 18, In. 13-14. The 
implication was that the marks were the normal redness and indentations that appear on skin 
when sleepers lay on rumpled bedclothes and that the marks would soon disappear. 
However, rather than waiting to see if the marks would disappear, Officer Cox concluded 
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that the baby had been injured and told Ms. Tracy that she wanted to come inside to be sure no 
one else was injured. At that point, the police entered the home without consent. Once inside, 
they did not find Mr. Tracy or any evidence of anyone injured. Rather, they found marijuana. 
Tr.10/31/12,p.19,ln. 7-p.20,ln.20. 
Photographs were taken of the baby at the home. Tr. 10/31/12, In. 22-24. In those 
photos, no injuries are apparent. Augmented Record, Exhibits to Defendant's Brief in Support of 
Motion to Suppress. And, as Ms. Tracy had predicted the red marks soon disappeared. Tr. 
10/31112, p. 25, In. 1 7-24; Tr. 4/28 and 20/12, p. 20, In. 1-11. Although Officer Cox testified 
that she thought the marks were consistent with having been hit "all over the baby's body," the 
police were not so concerned about the baby that they called paramedics or an ambulance. Tr. 
10/31/12, p. 29, In. 5-9; p. 36, In. 12-14. 
During the examination by the court at the suppression hearing, Officer Cox testified that 
often when people have nothing to hide, they just open their doors to the police and say, "Take a 
look." Tr. 10/31/12, p. 33, In. 16-19. Ms. Tracy's reluctance to follow this usual pattern was 
significant to Officer Cox. Tr. 10/31/12, p. 33, In. 1-25. 
In support of the motion to suppress, the defense argued, "[B]ased on the photo and the 
entirely reasonable explanation from Mrs. Tracy that the child had merely been napping and the 
red marks would soon disappear (which turned out to be true see attached photographs), the 
officers' decision to enter and search the house constitutes a violation of the Fourth 
Amendment." Augmented Record, Defendant's Brief in support of Motion to Suppress, filed 
9/7/12, p. 5. 
However, the court denied the motion to suppress concluding that the entry into the home 
4 
was justified by exigent circumstances. The court wrote: 
R 98. 
A neighbor reported a physical altercation to a 911 operator, stating that a female 
was being thrown and reporting loud sounds. The neighbor reported past 
incidents of the same sort involving the same couple. One of the police officers 
spoke to the reporting party over the phone before arriving at the residence. While 
Desirae attempted to assure the officer that there was no need for police concern, 
other circumstances indicated there were reasons for concern. While Desirae 
certainly had the right to decline to let the police enter, her refusal to allow the 
officer into the residence increased the concern that there may have been others 
needing help inside, or that she did not want the police to know that her husband 
had returned. The officers both observed what appeared to be recent injuries on 
an infant. And while these marks were not reflected in the later photographs, the 
court must evaluate the facts known or concerns that existed at the time the 
officers decided to enter the residence. Based upon the foregoing, the court 
concludes that there were exigent circumstances, specifically concerns of injuries 
to persons within the residence, that justified the warrantless entry into the 
residence. Accordingly, the motion to suppress is denied. 
Thereafter, Ms. Tracy entered a conditional guilty plea to a single count of possession of a 
controlled substance in violation ofl.C. § 18-204. The court entered a withheld judgment and 
placed Ms. Tracy on unsupervised probation for one year. R 111-112, 114-118. 
This appeal timely follows. R 120-124. 
III. ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Did the district court err in concluding that exigent circumstances justified a warrantless 
entry into Ms. Tracy's home? 
IV. ARGUMENT 
A. The Warrantless Entry Was Not Justified by Exigent Circumstances 
While an exigent circumstances exception exists to the warrant requirements of the 
Fourth Amendment and Idaho Const. Art. I, § 17, that exception did not apply in this case where 
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the police had no reasonable basis to believe that anyone was injured or in danger of injury and 
where even if the police had concerns, their concerns could have been resolved without making a 
warrantless intrusion into a home. 
The Fomth Amendment, as well as Article I, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution, 
protect the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures. The United States Supreme 
Court has held that the 'physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which 
the working of the Fourth Amendment is directed.' Such entries and other 
searches conducted without a warrant are presumed to be unreasonable, but there 
are a few carefully delineated exceptions to this presumption. The state bears the 
burden to show that a warrantless search either fell within one of these well-
recognized exceptions to the warrant requirements or was otherwise reasonable 
under the circumstances. 
State v. Ara;za, 147 Idaho 371,374,209 P.3d 668,672 (Ct. App. 2009) (citations omitted). 
The standard of review applied to the denial of a suppression motion is bifurcated. The 
trial court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence are accepted, but the 
appellate court freely reviews the application of constitutional principles to the facts as found. 
State v. Rojas-Tapia, 151 Idaho 479, 480-81, 259 P.3d 626-27 (Ct. App. 2011). 
The exigent circumstances exception allows for warrantless searches by state agents when 
there is compelling need for official action and no time to secure a warrant. Ara;za, supra . 
. . . the test for application of this warrant exception is whether the facts known to 
the agent at the time of entry, together with reasonable inferences, would warrant 
a reasonable belief that an exigency justified the intrusion. A law enforcement 
officer's reasonable belief of danger to the police or to other persons inside or 
outside the dwelling is one type of exigency that may justify a warrantless entry. 
Thus, the necessity to protect or preserve life or avoid serious injury will 
legitimize an otherwise illegal intrusion. Accordingly, law enforcement officers 
may enter a home without a warrant to render emergency assistance to an injured 
occupant or to protect an occupant from imminent injury. 
Araiza, 147 Idaho at 374-75, 209 P.3d at 671-72 (citations omitted). 
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However, even when there are exigent circumstances, the police do not have license to 
violate constitutional privacy rights any more than necessary to address the immediate exigency. 
State v. SaUas, 129 Idaho 432,435,925 P.2d 1131, 1134 (Ct. App. 1996). 
The presence or absence of exigent circumstances in cases of alleged domestic 
disturbances has been repeatedly addressed by the Idaho courts. 
In Sailas, supra, exigent circumstances were found when the police responded to a 
domestic disturbance call. Upon approaching the home, officers could hear yelling and 
screaming. When they knocked on the door a bloodied woman answered and gestured in a 
manner that the officers interpreted to be an invitation to enter. From the doorway, an officer 
could see the defendant and a small child. The woman said that she and the defendant had been 
fighting, but that everything was now fine and she had asked the defendant to leave and did not 
need assistance from the police. Sailas argued that the woman's statements that all was well 
indicated that there was no exigency, but the Court of Appeals disagreed. The Court wrote, 
"When a law enforcement officer has interrupted a domestic dispute that has already grown 
violent, the officer can reasonably suspect that such a statement by an injured victim is prompted 
by duress or fear ofretaliation from the perpetrator who is still present." 129 Idaho at 435, 925 
P.2d at 1134. In approving the entry, the Court also noted that the intrusiveness of the entry was 
limited. "They [the police] took only such action as was necessary to calm the combatants, 
ascertain their identity and prevent further physical harm. Neither officer acted outside the scope 
of the justification for the entry." Id 
State v. w;edenhefl, 136 Idaho 14, 27 P .3d 873 (Ct. App. 2001 ), followed. In that case, 
police responded to a 911 call reporting possible domestic violence. When they arrived, 
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Wiedenheft's house was dark and quiet. The officers knocked on the door and a light came on 
and then went out. They knocked again and Ms. Wiedenheft, with a red swollen recent injury to 
her forehead answered. She was shaking, had an unsteady voice and was visibly upset. The 
police asked to come inside and she said no. When they asked again to enter, Ms. Wiendenheft 
again refused and tried to close the door. An officer put his foot in the doorway and leaned 
forward and Ms. Wiedenheft hit him in the shoulder with the door. A second officer was also hit 
by the door. Ms. Wiedenheft was removed from the house, put into handcuffs and charged with 
resisting and obstructing. 136 Idaho at 15, 27 P.3d at 874. 
The Court of Appeals held that Ms. Wiedenheft's resistance to entry into her home was 
unlawful because the police had exigent circumstances to justify their actions. However, again 
the Court of Appeals cautioned," ... that a prompt and limited search of the scene should be 
strictly circumscribed by the exigency, to assist an injured party or deal with the perpetrator, and 
cannot be used to support a general exploratory search. Thus an officer may not act outside the 
scope of the justification for the entry." 136 Idaho at 17, 27 P.3d at 876. Judge Schwartzman 
wrote a special concurrence to emphasize that allegations of domestic violence did not give 
police carte blanc he to conduct a general exploratory search or protective sweep of the premises 
in Wiedenheft' s case and that any investigation had to be conducted with the most limited 
intrusion necessary to dispel their concerns - including possibly just a continued conversation on 
the threshold of the house. 136 Idaho at 17-18, 27 P.3d at 876-77. 
That same year, the Court decided State v. Pearson-Anderson, 136 Idaho 84 7, 41 P.3d 
275 (Ct. App. 2001). In that case, the police received a hang up 911 call. When they called 
back, someone answered and immediately hung up again. When the police went to the home, 
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they could hear yelling and saw Pearson-Anderson and Anderson on the ground in the threshold 
of the back door to the home struggling with one another. The officers separated the couple and 
frisked them. During questioning of Pearson-Anderson, she said that she had called 911, but 
Anderson caused the hang up. She said that they had been fighting and Anderson had prevented 
her from leaving. She also said that the fight arose because she had given the key to the house to 
another woman who had come inside and damaged some properly. Pearson-Anderson said that 
woman was no longer in the house. The police entered the home to ensure no one was inside. 
136 Idaho at 849, 41 P.3d at 277. 
The Court of Appeals found that the entry was justified by exigent circumstances noting 
that Pearson-Anderson's statements had raised the possibility of a third person being involved, 
that in calling 911 Pearson-Anderson diminished her expectation of privacy by calling the police 
to her house with an implied representation of an emergency, and that when there is a 911 hang 
up call, the state has a "heavy" governmental interest in assuring that the danger or distress which 
prompted the call has been discovered and resolved. 136 Idaho at 850-51, 41 P.3d at 278-79. 
Again, Judge Schwartzman wrote a separate concurrence to voice his constitutional 
concerns that domestic violence cases do not, ipso facto, give police carte blanche to conduct a 
general exploratory search or protective sweep of the entire premises in every case as a matter of 
standard operating procedure. Judge Schwartzman noted that further investigation in this case 
could have continued outside the mobile home or inside the front door but that the police could 
not have "trooped through" every room in the household in the absence of articulable, reasonable 
suspicion involving officer safety or search for victims. 136 Idaho at 851, 41 P.3d at 279. 
In 2008, the Court decided State v. Reynolds. supra. In that case, police had a report that 
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Mrs. Reynolds was being held against her will by Mr. Reynolds. The Court found no exigent 
circumstances to justify a warrantless entry into the Reynolds home. 
In this case, the only factor that suggested a possible exigency was the report that 
Reynolds' wife was being held against her will. By the time the officers arrived, 
however, Reynolds was standing outside the house, and the front door was ajar. 
With the couple thus separated, it was apparent that if there was a woman in the 
house, she was under no immediate risk of harm from Reynolds while he was 
outside being questioned by an officer. Therefore, there was no exigency that 
would justify entry into the house without first knocking or calling out to bring 
any occupant to the door where she could be interviewed and the situation 
assessed. If Officer Harmon had first knocked or called out to occupants and 
received no response, the telephoned report of a woman being held against her 
will could have justified a warrantless entry to ensure that there was no one in the 
house who was physically restrained or too frightened to respond to the officers, 
but that did not occur. 
146 Idaho at 471, 197 P.3d at 332. 
Ms. Tracy's case is like Reynolds - there were no exigent circumstances. Although there 
was a 911 report of a disturbance (a call from a neighbor, not, as in Pearson-Anderson, supra, by 
the resident of the home), when the police arrived, nothing was going on. There was no yelling, 
no sounds or other evidence of arguments or fighting. Ms. Tracy came to the door and, unlike 
the women in Salias, supra, and Weidenhefl, supra, was uninjured. The police saw her children. 
There was no suspicion that the older child had any injuries. And, Ms. Tracy brought the baby to 
the officers for their inspection. The baby was calm and quiet. There was no testimony that the 
officers heard the baby cry or that the baby looked like he had been crying. While the officers 
saw red marks on the baby, Ms. Tracy gave them a perfectly reasonable and ultimately true 
explanation for the marks - the marks were from sleeping and quickly disappeared. 
As repeatedly noted by the Court of Appeals. any search based upon exigent 
circumstances must be limited to the least intrusive means available to dispel concerns. Sailas, 
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supra; Wiedenheft, supra; Pearson-Anderson, supra; Reynolds, supra. The police in this case 
testified that they entered Ms. Tracy's home without a warrant because of concerns for injured 
people inside. However, all the occupants of the house had been in the doorway of the home and 
were available there for inspection. Having seen all the occupants of the home, the police did not 
have any reasonable basis to enter the home because they were concerned that the occupants 
were injured. Even if the police had actually believed that the baby was injured, which is 
somewhat doubtful as they did not request any medical attention for the baby, there was no 
exigency that would not have allowed them to keep the baby with them in the doorway for a few 
minutes to see if Ms. Tracy's explanation of the red marks would prove accurate. If the police 
had waited a few minutes, they would have concluded without any doubt whatsoever that no 
occupants of the house were injured. 
Furthermore, the entry into the home could not be justified as a necessary search for Mr. 
Tracy. Both the 911 caller and Ms. Tracy had told the police that he was no longer at the home. 
And, if the police disbelieved Ms. Tracy and the neighbor, they could have given Ms. Tracy the 
option of coming outside the home with her children and waiting while they secured the proper 
warrant. Instead of pursuing this least intrusive method, the police entered the home without a 
warrant. See Reynolds, supra. 
This was a violation of the Fourth Amendment and Article I, § 17. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, Ms. Tracy respectfully asks this Court to reverse the order 
denying the motion to suppress and remand with instructions to allow her to withdraw her 
conditional guilty plea and to dismiss the case. 
r( 
Submitted this ~,.,..day of August, 2013. 
Deborah Whipple 
Attorney for Desirae Trac 
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